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Abstract
In this paper we concentrate on the nature of the liar paradox as a
cognitive entity; a consistently testable configuration of properties. We
elaborate further on a quantum mechanical model [Aerts, Broekaert,
Smets 1999] that has been proposed to analyze the dynamics involved,
and we focus on the interpretation and concomitant philosophical pic-
ture. Some conclusions we draw from our model favor an effective
realistic interpretation of cognitive reality.
1 Introduction.
Our approach, to analyze the Liar paradox as a cognitive entity, emerges nat-
urally from research on integrating world views (Worldviews Group, 1994,
1995; Broekaert, 1999). The justification is based on their necessary inclu-
sion in an encompassing model. An integrating world view can be based
on a model of interacting layers epistemically corresponding to the various
contemporary sciences (CLEA,1997). Basically, in the same way as we view
social entities in a social layer, or quantum entities in the quantum — which
in this context can be viewed as the pre-material — layer, we place cognitive
entities in a cognitive layer of reality. Which is considered the expanse where
the personal and interpersonal cognitive interactions are taking place, and
which will be elaborated in the next section.
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In this paper, we will work with versions of the Liar Sentence with index or
sentence pointers followed by the sentence this index points at. Typically
we will either concentrate on the single sentence version;
‘Single Liar’
(1) sentence (1) is false
or the two sentence version;
‘Double Liar’
(1) sentence (2) is false
(2) sentence (1) is true
First, we stress that it is not our intention to construct a solution for the
paradox, but we will concentrate in this paper on a model of the self-
referential circularity — more precisely, the truth-value dynamics — in-
volved. In this way, we are able to understand the nature of the liars’
paradoxicality by modelling the typical truth-value oscillation in the en-
compassing framework. By taking this position there is no need to go into
details of ‘solving’-strategies that have been proposed in the literature. Ac-
tually, the most important of these strategies are specifically constructed to
avoid the paradox by, for example, declaring it ‘ungrammatical’, or ‘mean-
ingless’ or ‘ungrounded’. All these strategies, of which we only mentioned
some, and those that introduced truth value ‘gaps’ or ‘gluts’, have proven
valuable, and serve here to distinguish the present position. For more details
on the mentioned solving strategies, see for example (Grim 1991, chp 1).
Finally, we mention some issues concerning the recourse taken to the quan-
tummechanical formalism in describing cognitive entities. Contrary to the
present paper, many attempts have been made to approach ‘emergent’ phe-
nomena — like cognition — through complex dynamics. Focusing on the
collective dynamics of quite different entities, some very similar patterns
are encountered regardless of the nature of the substrate. This has been
pointed out in research pertaining to the theories of nonlinearity and com-
plexity. Because of the efficacy of these theories, tentative conclusions about
the nature of — quite disparate — processes in reality can be inferred from
structural-dynamical similarities. Although, we have to stress that these
similarities generally involve only so called ‘noncontextual’ entities, as the
theories of nonlinearity and complexity are fundamentally classical theories.
By noncontextuality we mean that the entity will ‘not’ be influenced by an
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act of observation (measurement of the entity). A direct consequence of the
fact that the theories of nonlinearity and complexity are classical determin-
istic. It is now our claim that cognitive entities — especially of the type of
the liar paradox — share with quantum entities a variable, and sometimes
high, contextual nature: i.e. also cognitive entities, as it is the case for
quantum entities, are influenced by the act of measurement, which in the
case of a cognitive entity is generated by the cognitive interaction. There-
fore the theory of quantum mechanics can be used in analyzing the nature
of cognitive entities and more specifically the nature of the liar paradox. In
(Aerts, Broekaert, Smets, 1999) we built a quantum mechanical model that
fits this purpose. With respect to the high contextual nature of intricate
cognitive and also social entities, we can point out an approach where the
probability model that results in an opinion pole — with important influence
of the interviewer on the interviewee — is of a quantum mechanical nature
(Aerts,1998; Aerts and Aerts,1995,1996; Aerts, Coecke and Smets,1999). In
a similar way, we encounter an important contextual influence of an observer
reading (observing) the liar paradox sentences. In this case the high contex-
tuality will occur through the observer — the cognitive person — reasoning
through the self-referent entity.
2 Cognitive Entities
The existence of a cognitive entity is recognized by its aptitude of being
generally and cognitively influenced on as a practically stable configuration,
e.g. in the reasoning on it and communicating about it, and by the limited
number of different states that it can be in. The cognitive entity is endowed
with properties and relations with the other elements of its layer. Their
internal coherence relates to language as well as conceptions of experience.
The extent to which it is related to pendants in the physical and other
layers enhances its identity and its granted coincidence with the physically
real entity. This variable correspondence relation is put forward between
entities of the ontological cognitive layer and their pendants in physical or
other layers.
In order to give a more precise and complete characterization of the cogni-
tive entity, we need to reconstruct its interaction profile. This is done by
specifying the different kinds of measurements or experiments appropriate
to the intended entity. This necessarily happens with the intervention of
the cognitive person — the conscious human being conceiving the cognitive
entity.
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We distinguish between those entities that refer to elements of layers other
than the cognitive one and entities that do not. Arguably, such a distinction
may only be possible in specific phases of cognition and theory forming,
respecting personal psychological evolution. In both cases, the influencing
or intervening of the cognitive person will be different; engendering physical
interventions or only cognition, reasoning.
We define such an intervention as a kind of measurement on the entity
with the aim of gaining information or increasing knowledge on its precise
state. In order to keep our analogy with the physical layer, we restrict our
exposition here to measurements that characterize the state of a cognitive
entity.
The state formalizes specific — or all — possible actualisations according
the interaction profile. The exhaustive description being practically impos-
sible, an idealized state description can only be obtained for the overall
state. We mention however that this problem appears in an analogous way
in physics, where in each model also only an idealized state description is
obtained, depending on the possible experiments that are available. Hence,
a specific property state corresponds, as in physics, to appropriate measure-
ments that are available. In the case of the liar paradox entity, the exact
meaning of the truth-state will be explained in the next section. The mea-
surements that characterize the state of an entity referring to the classical-
material layer are mostly straightforward. For example, analyzing if a piece
of chalk is breakable has a fixed measurement-procedure namely, breaking
the piece of chalk. This gives the corresponding entity a classical behavior
in the sense that each time we perform the measurement we obtain, with
certainty, the same result. In a quantum mechanical context we say that
such entities are in an ‘eigenstate’ for the corresponding measurement. Also
cognitive entities that do not refer to other layers can have straightforward
measurement-procedures. Especially in the case of e.g. a mathematical the-
orem, there is often a straightforward procedure to establish a proof for it.
And indeed each time we apply the same procedure, we obtain the same
result, so we say again that those entities are in an eigenstate correspond-
ing to this measurement procedure. Naturally, we do not expect everybody
to know these mathematics, so the state of that same theorem will depend
on what we call the ‘cognitive background’ of each cognitive person. Even
mathematicians will have different opinions on the status of some theorems,
therefore it is clear that the general cognitive background of people, over
history, is important and plays a role in the nature of the states that will
be attributed to cognitive entities. As this example points out, the nonfixed
character of knowledge implies we accord states of nonfixed character to
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cognitive entities. Again however, we remark that this is analogous to the
physical situation. The state of a physical entity, defined correspondingly to
measurement procedures, depends also on the general body of experimental
possibilities at a certain epoch of time in the history of human culture, and
hence is not fixed once and forever. Depending on whether this state has
been defined by more ‘universal’ methods of experimentation, the state will
approach in a deeper way the ontology of the entity. The same holds true
for the state of a cognitive entity.
In the case of the liar paradox as a cognitive entity, for any measurement
procedure, the truth-value will give us different results each time we inter-
vene with it. Here, the state describing the truth-value will be called a
superposition state as related to the measurement procedure in question,
in analogy with the quantum mechanical concept. This means that we can
not obtain a ‘certain’ prediction — in a classical sense — of properties,
in this case ‘thruth’ of ‘false’, of that cognitive entity. The input of the
quantummechanical formalism is therefore appropriate.
How does one measure the liar paradox? The measurement here consists
of two part-processes, ’reading the sentence’ and ‘making a sentence true
or false’. This means that in our description the liar paradox within the
cognitive layer of reality is ‘in general’ — before the measurement — not
in a state such that a reading would give true or false. The ‘true state ’
and the ‘false state ’ of the sentence are specific states; ‘eigenstates’ of the
measurement. In general, the state of the liar paradox is not one of these
two eigenstates. Due to the act of measurement, and in analogy with what
happens during a quantum measurement, the state of the sentence changes
(‘collapses’) into one of the two possible eigenstates, the ‘true state’ or the
‘false state’. This act of making a sentence true or false can be specifically
described as ‘read it and make an hypothesis about its truth or falsehood’. In
the next section we will apply this approach to the Double Liar, and see that
an initial measurement followed by the sequence of logical inferences puts
into work an oscillation dynamics that we can describe by a Schro¨dinger
evolution over reasoning-time. We will also see in the next section, that
the change of state due to measurement can be described by a projection
operator in the quantum mechanical Hilbert space where the Schro¨dinger
evolution is defined.
Once we make an hypothesis about one sentence the whole entity starts
changing from one truth-state into another by continued reading with log-
ical inference. When we stop this process, by means of not ‘looking at’
or ‘reasoning on’ the sentences any more, the entity — we hypothesise —
reestablishes its original superposition state of indefiniteness. This super-
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position state does not correspond to what has been called a truth value
gap and does not assign a third truth value to the liar. In this sense, in our
model, the set of semantical truth values, of which only one can be assigned
to the cognitive entity, does not contain a third truth value or a value gap.
Finally, we remark some interpretative issues concerning the origin of the
entity’s dynamics and the nature of the cognitive layer. From the quan-
tummechanical analogy, the temporal evolution of the entity is expected to
originate intrinsically, still the construction of the evolution — as will be
clear from the next section — supposes the cognitive person’s motivation
by reasoning. We interpret the latter to be reflected in the autonomous
dynamics, as such, the cognitive entity obtains its cognitive essence. The
precise origin of temporal evolution has thereby become less transparent;
the entity as well as the cognitive person will engender identical evolution.
The nature of the cognitive layer, is essentially different from the sphere
spanned by common material objects. In our approach — akin to ‘effective’
realism — the cognitive layer is ‘Hilbert-space like’, a personal and mental
construct with social and cultural conditioning, a collective dynamic emer-
gent layer carried by its cognitive participators. The extent and subtlety of
this issue, allows in the present context merely explanatory simplifications.
More detailed elaborations of the cognitive layer as an emergent, Hilbert-
space like sphere in social groups are due (Aerts, Broekaert and Gabora,
1999).
3 The Liar-paradox: A Quantum Description of
its Truth Behavior.
We will first discuss the Single Liar entity. By ‘measuring’ the single sen-
tence we attribute a chosen truth-value to the sentence, immediately and
logically inferring from its lecture the opposite truth-value. The cognitive
person is therefore inclined to attribute in an alternating manner opposite
truth values to the Single Liar sentence, until the ‘measuring’ process is cho-
sen to be stopped. Subsequently no decisive and unambiguous truth-value
can be attributed to the Single Liar sentence as it is. The application of the
quantummechanical formalism suggests to describe this situation by a super-
position of opposite truth-value states. We remark the striking correspon-
dence between truth values and the two-fold eigenvalues of a spin-1/2 state
of some quantum particles (e.g. an electron), and the oscillatory dynamics
present in the reasoning dynamics respectively the evolution dynamics of a
spin-1/2 particle in a constant magnetic field. This formal correspondence
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will be used to construct a dynamical representation of the cognitive entity.
Recall that this correspondence is possible, due to the fact that the spin
of a particle is a quantized property, it exposes itself by means of distinct
spin values. For a spin-1/2 particle there are only two distinct spin values
namely ‘up’ and ‘down’ — appropriately corresponding to ‘true’ and ‘false’
values for the cognitive entity. The quantum mechanical formalism enables
to express a superposition of these ‘up’ and ‘down’ states of a spin-1/2 par-
ticle by simple addition. When we apply the same idea to the single liar
sentence, we obtain a state Ψ described by a pondered superposition of the
two states of opposite truth-value:
Ψ = ctrue
(
1
0
)
+ cfalse
(
0
1
)
The measurement itself, namely the interaction of the cognitive person on
the entity when the sentence is being made true or being made false is
described respectively by the true-projector Ptrue or false-projector Pfalse.
Ptrue =
(
1 0
0 0
)
Pfalse =
(
0 0
0 1
)
In this quantum mechanical description, the true-measurement (false mea-
surement) on the superposed state Ψ results in the true state (resp. false
state). The true state is represented as follows :
PtrueΨ = ctrue
(
1
0
)
where the square modulus of the corresponding pondering factor ctrue gives
the statistical probability of finding the entity in the true-state. An un-
equivocal result is therefore not obtained when the superposition does not
leave out one of the states completely, i.e. either ctrue or cfalse is zero. Only
in those instances do we unambiguously attribute to a sentence its truth or
falsehood.
We now look at the Double Liar sentences in more formal and mathematical
detail. We consider three situations:
A
{
(1) sentence (2) is false
(2) sentence (1) is true
7
B{
(1) sentence (2) is true
(2) sentence (1) is true
C
{
(1) sentence (2) is false
(2) sentence (1) is false
From the case of the Single Liar we expect here a representation of the truth-
behaviour by coupled C2 vectors, one for each sentence. Closer inspection of
the coupled sentences of the two-sentence liar paradox of type (B) and (C),
shows this is possible. The measurement of the Double Liar (B) allways will
couple true-states of (B1) and (B2), and false-states of (B1) and (B2). In
the case (C) on the other hand, measurement will couple the true-state of
(B1) to the false-state of (B2), and the false-state of (B1) to the true-state
of (B2). From a formal point of view, the equivalent spin-states in quantum
mechanics would be described by the so called ‘singlet state’ and a ‘triplet
state’ respectively. The singlet state indicates that two spin-1/2 particles are
anti-alined and in an anti-symmetrical state , while a triplet state indicates
that two spin-1/2 particles are alined and in a symmetrical state.
Whereas the Single Liar has been mathematically represented in a C2 finite
dimensional complex Hilbert Space, we now need a C2⊗C2 space for the
description of the (B) or (C) Double Liar. The tensorproduct ⊗ connects
the two sentences into one composed entity.
In the specific case of (C), and taking into account the anti-symmetric spin
analog, Ψ is written as:
1√
2
{(
1
0
)
⊗
(
0
1
)
−
(
0
1
)
⊗
(
1
0
)}
Still, in the application to the cognitive entity other choices of the pondering
coefficients are possible. The only constraints on the coefficients are: equal
amplitude and addition of the squared amplitudes to unity.
The state-vector for the liar paradox in case (B) can be constructed in a
similar manner:
1√
2
{(
1
0
)
⊗
(
1
0
)
+
(
0
1
)
⊗
(
0
1
)}
The projection operators which make sentence one and respectively sentence
two true are now:
P1,true =
(
1 0
0 0
)
⊗ 12 P2,true = 11 ⊗
(
1 0
0 0
)
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The projection operators that make the sentences false are obtained by
switching the elements 1 and 0 on the diagonal of the matrix. These four
projection operators represent the possible ‘logical’ interactions between the
cognitive person and the cognitive entity.
During the continued measurement on the entities (B) and (C), the sequence
of logical inferences results in a repetitive pattern of consecutive true-false
states. These patterns are not very complicated, in case of entity (B) it will
be a repetition of true-states (resp. false-states) depending on whether we
presupposed an initial true (resp. false) state. While in the case of entity
(C) it will always be an alternation between true-states and false states, no
matter which state we presupposed.
Finally, we describe in detail the original double liar paradox, case (A). In
this case we will show how the true-false cycle originates from the Schro¨dinger
time-evolution of the appropriate initial state.
Instead of working within the coupled Hilbert space C2⊗C2, as in cases (B)
and (C), we have to use a space of higher dimension for (A). This com-
plexification is due to the fact that no initial state can be found in the
restricted space C2⊗C2, such that application of the four true-false pro-
jection operators results in four orthogonal states respectively representing
the four truth-falsehood states. The existence of such a superposition state
— with equal amplitudes of its components — is required to describe the
entity prior to, and after, any measurement procedure. If we perform the
continued measurement on (A), by consecutive logical inference, the dy-
namical pattern is not anymore a two-step process like in the previous cases
(B) and (C),instead we have a four-step process. Starting from the initial
superposition state this four-step process can not be described by the cou-
pled spin-1/2 models any more. In order to resolve this problem, recourse
has to be taken to a 4 dimensional Hilbert-space for each sentence. The
Hilbert-space needed to describe the Double Liar (A) is therefore C4⊗C4.
The initial un-measured superposition state — Ψ0 — of the Double Liar (A)
is given by any equally pondered superposition of the four true-false states:
1
2




0
0
1
0

⊗


0
1
0
0

+


0
1
0
0

⊗


0
0
0
1

 +


0
0
0
1

⊗


1
0
0
0

+


1
0
0
0

⊗


0
0
1
0




Each next term in this superposition state is the consecutive state which
is reached in the course of time, when the paradox is reasoned through.
The truth-falsehood values attributed to these states, refer to the chosen
measurement projectors.
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Making a sentence true or false in the act of measurement, will be described
by the appropriate projection operators in C4⊗C4. In the case we make
sentence 1 (resp. sentence 2) true we get:
P1,true =


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0

⊗ 12 P2,true = 11 ⊗


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0


The projectors for the false-states are constructed by placing the 1 on the
final diagonal place:
P1,false =


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

⊗ 12 P2,false = 11 ⊗


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1


As a consequence of making a freely chosen sentence of (A) either true
or false, by logical inference the four consecutive states are repeatedly run
trough. In order to give a time-ordered description of this cyclic change
of state, a continous time t is introduced as an ordering parameter. The
time-odering parameter extrapolates the discrete moments of consecutive
outcomes of the logical inferences, and as such relates to the physical time
of reasoning. Under these interpretative restrictions a Schro¨dinger evolution
over ‘time’ can be constructed.
Essentially, a Hamiltonian H can be constructed, such that the unitary
evolution operator U(t) — with U(t) = e−iHt — describes the cyclic change
of logical inferences.
The construction of the evolution operator U(t) is more easily accomplished
by switching temporarily to an equivalent representation in a larger Hilbert
space. Switching to a C16 Hilbert-space is done without any modification or
alteration of the problem, as it is isomorphic to the original C4⊗C4 coupled
Hilbert space.
A new basis in C16 is constructed from the basis of C4⊗C4 ( i and j from 1
to 4 ) :
ei ⊗ ej = eκ(i,j) and κ(i, j) = 4(i− 1) + j
Where κ is the natural basis transformation function from the C4 ⊗ C4 to
the C16 Hilbert space, and the index from the new basis states in C16.
The initial superposition state Ψ0 can now be represented in C
16 by:
Ψ0 =
1
2
{e10 + e8 + e13 + e3}
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For notational ease we continue to work further in a 4-dimensional sub-
space of C16, namely this subspace generated by the basis (e10, e8, e13, e3).
Obviously we do not loose any information by this restriction. The 4 by
4 submatrix — UD — of the discrete unitary evolution operator, which
describes the time-evolution at discrete instants of time when consecutive
outcomes of logical inferences have been reached, is:
UD =


0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0


In order to obtain a description at every instance of the time-ordering param-
eter, a procedure of diagonalisation on the submatrix UD is performed, i.e.
UD|diag. The diagonalisation procedure allows to solve the matrix equation
by breaking it into four uncoupled scalar equations. From the Schro¨dinger
evolution and Stone’s Theorem we obtain:
Hsub|diag = i lnUD|diag
Inverting the procedure of diagonalisation, the infinitesimal generator of the
time-evolution — the submatrix hamiltonian — is obtained :
Hsub =


−1/2 −1/2 (1− i)/2 (1 + i)/2
−1/2 −1/2 (1 + i)/2 (1− i)/2
(1 + i)/2 (1− i)/2 1/2 1/2
(1− i)/2 (1 + i)/2 1/2 1/2


Or in terms of gamma matrices (these are merely introduced for shorthand
notation for there is no implication of relativistic nature):
Hsub =
1
2
(−γ0 − γ5 + γ0γ1) + i
2
(γ1 + γ2γ3 + γ0γ5)
The submatrix of the evolution operator U(t), valid at all intermediary times
t is then given by the expression:
Usub(t) = e
−iHsubt
The time evolution operator Usub(t) in the 4-dimensional subspace of C
16 is:
Usub(t) =
1
4
{(
1 + e−it + eit + e2it
)
1 + i
(
1− e−it − eit + e2it
)
γ2γ3
−
(
1− e2it
)
γ5 + i
(
e−it − eit
)
γ0γ5 − i
(
−e−it + eit
)
γ1
}
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In order to finalise our initial claim, we should bring back the hamiltonian
H as well as the time-evolution operator U(t) in the original C4⊗C4 Hilbert
space. Although the outcome is straightforward to obtain by using the basis
transformation function κ(i, j), the complexity of the expression necessitates
shorthand notation:
H =
16∑
κ,λ=1
Hsubκ(i,j)λ(u,v)Oiu ⊗Ojv
and
U(t) =
16∑
κ,λ=1
Usubκ(i,j)λ(u,v)(t)Oiu ⊗Ojv
with;
Oiu ⊗Ojv = {ei.etu} ⊗ {ej .etv}
For example, the term κ = 3 , λ = 10 of the time evolution operator U(t) is
given by;
1
4
(1− ie−it + ie−it − ie2it)


0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

⊗


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0


Finally, we complete the dynamical picture of the Double Liar cognitive en-
tity (A); when submitted to any measurement at choice, the entity starts its
truth-falsehood cycle, when left un-measured the entity remains statically
in its undifferentiated superposition state. The latter statement follows im-
mediately from the fact that the initial state Ψ0 is left unchanged by the
dynamical evolution U(t);
Ψ0(t) = Ψ0
Ψ0 is a time invariant, as it is an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian H. Ex-
actly this time invariance points to the fact that the state Ψ0 describes the
existence of the cognitive entity (A) in its cognitive space, independent of
any observer. The highly contextual nature of the Double Liar (A) — its
unavoidable dynamics engendered by measuring it — implies, intrinsically
it can not expose its complete nature, analogous to the quantum entities of
the micro-physical world.
The evolution over the time-ordering parameter t of the truth behaviour
of the cognitive entity during the measurement process can be illustrated
graphically.
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Temporal evolution of the cognitive evaluation of the Double Liar (A). At time-
ordering parameter t = 0, a ‘false’-measurement on (A1) has been executed on
the initial state Ψ0 (short-dashed line). The second consecutive step in the logical
inference, the ‘true’-state of (A2) at time-ordering parameter t = Pi
2
, and the
intermediary times, is shown by the long-dashed line. For clarity, consecutive steps
have been deleted. Discrete moments of outcomes of logical inferences are at time-
ordering parameter t = npi
2
4 Conclusion.
We found that the quantum mechanical formalism can be applied to self-
referent cognitive entities as the single liar and double liar paradox. Essen-
tially the two necessary features of the dynamics were constructed; when
measured the entity starts its truth-falsehood cycle, when left un-measured
the entity remains invariantly in its initial state. A measurement of the en-
tity — engendered by appropriating one sentence its truth or falsehood —
sets into action the dynamical evolution which attributes, alternatively over
time, truth and falsehood to the coupled sentences. The unmeasured en-
tity Ψ0 does not change over time, its invariance reflects its emergent nature.
The truth-falsehood alternation, due to a measurement process, and the
time-invariance of the initial state are both derived from constructed evolu-
tion operator U(t), driven by the Hamiltonian H. The quantum formalism
therefore has proven an appropriate tool to describe the liar paradox entity.
We set out with the idea of realist cognitive entity, if it can be generally and
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cognitively influenced on as a practically stable configuration, and by the
limited number of different states that it can be in. We put forward that
exactly this time invariance points to the fact that the state Ψ0 describes
the existence of the cognitive entity in its cognitive space, independent of
any observer. For this reason we take the position at liberty to put forward
a realistic picture of the cognitive reality, in the sense that Ψ0(t) represents
the state of the real entity.
The nature of the cognitive layer, as here proposed, is essentially different
from the space of common macroscopic material objects. The cognitive layer
is ‘Hilbert-space like’, and originates from the cognitive person. Quite dif-
ferent from the complexity-theory approach, which emphasizes dynamics,
the present formalism clearly describes the emergent entity as an ontolog-
ical state. An important question in our research therefore remains; the
relation between the quantum mechanical state description and the non-
linear approach of complex dynamics. Rather speculatively some relation
between privileged states in both models could be expected. A model ex-
posing common grounds to both formalisms could in first approach allow
inquiry into the relation between the quantum mechanical eigenstates of the
Hamiltonian and the phase-space attractors of the corresponding non-linear
evolution equations. Eventually, more detailed elaborations of the cognitive
layer as an emergent, Hilbert-space like sphere in social groups, can relate
both approaches.
The generalisation to other cognitive entities with reference to non-cognitive
entities or processes can most probably, to extent, be covered by the ǫ-model
formalism (Aerts, 1986, Aerts and Durt 1994, Aerts, Durt and Van Bogaert
1993). This model allows to describe effects of intermediary contextuality,
which is expected in common cognitive entities. Further development needs
to bring into the formalism, a general dynamic, and contextual influences
other than those of the cognitive person on the truth behavior of the cogni-
tive entities.
Philosophical questions, quite speculative at this stage of our research, can
be put forward: e.g. Can we, from the example of the Liar paradox, learn
something in general about the nature and origin of dynamical change?
What real life experiments can underpin the realistic approach to the cog-
nitive entities?
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